Xenophon and his times by William Aaron Kraus
－ 21－
Xenophon and his times
William Aaron Kraus
 Xenophon, the son of Gryllus, was born in Athens around 428 
B.C.E., during the early stages of the Peloponnesian War and near 
the death of Pericles, and he died at about 354 B.C.E. in Corinth 
(Anderson, Xenophon, p.9).  Xenophon belonged to the class of 
Knights in Athens who were wealthy enough to maintain their 
own horses and, thus, could participate in the cavalry unit of the 
Athenian army.  This class suffered severely near the end of the 
Peloponnesian War, because after Sparta invaded Attica it ruined 
many of their estates and, consequently, it was this class which 
favored a swift end to this war (Anderson, p. 42). 
 At this time, during Xenophon's youth, Athens was at the peak 
of her power.  The Athenian fleet was the finest in the Aegean 
Sea area; Athens was economically secure as the treasurer for the 
Delian League and had used this income in order to build fine 
public works such as the Parthenon on the Acropolis.  Athens was 
also politically stable and efficient in its democratic process and 
artistically had just enjoyed an explosive period of government 
subsidies set aside for artistic works in sculpture and architecture 
(Anderson, p.41).  However, in 431 B.C.E. Athens entered into what 
seemed to be a simple dispute with Sparta, but what would, in 
fact, turn into a thirty year struggle called the Peloponnesian War. 
The turning point for Athens was at the death of Pericles in 429 B.C.E. 
when no one seemed to be able to continue his strong leadership, 
which eventually relegated the remainder of the fifth century B.C.E. 
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to a travesty of military blunders and a lavish waste of wealth as 
an exhausting war of attrition between these two Greek powers 
for predominance took place (Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 
pp. 86-87).
 Young men like Xenophon and his contemporaries such 
as Plato grew up during this period, and it is at this time that 
many of them developed a great distaste for the Athenian style 
of democracy.  For these two in particular, it had been the folly 
of democratic government which had led to Athens' ultimate 
downfall as the predominant cultural and military leader of 
the Greek world.  It had been the quick-tempered sort of hasty 
decision-making, personified by Athenian politics, which had been 
behind its delay in beginning the Sicilian Expedition of 415 B.C.E., 
and this was a prime reason for the turning point in the war 
when it later became known as the Sicilian disaster of 413 B.C.E. 
Conversely, it was the careful, cool-headedness of the Spartan style 
of government which eventually enabled her to outlast Athens and 
rise to power (Thucydides, p. 426).
 Thus, Xenophon had grown up during an era of enduring 
pessimism and national humiliation, where the repeated mistakes 
of a democratic nation had fatally drained its own vitality and 
strength and tainted its specter of superiority in the eyes of its 
youth, ending very quickly a unique age of artistic and cultural 
prosperity.  In his Hellenika, written perhaps forty years after 
the event, Xenophon exemplifies this lavish waste of wealth and 
manpower with his description of the Battle of Arginusae in 406 B.C.E. 
Athens lost twenty five ships in this victory over the Spartan fleet, 
and the Athenian generals tried to rescue the survivors, but were 
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obstructed by a severe storm which led to the death of thousands 
of their soldiers (Xenophon, A History of My Times, pp. 84-85). 
Although this was technically an Athenian victory, six of the eight 
generals were, nevertheless, put to death for their incompetence. 
Xenophon, an eyewitness to this disgraceful performance of the 
Athenian assembly, recorded the hasty decisions and lack of 
fairness in the debate over the generals' fate.  He records one of the 
defenders of the generals, Euryptolemus, who argues the following:
　　And what reason have you for this excessive haste?  What 
are you frightened of?  You are Athenians and Athenians do 
not act like this.  The laws are your own creation and it is 
the laws, above all, which have made you great.  Abide by 
them and never attempt to do anything without their sanction. 
　　…Men of Athens, you have won a great and fortunate 
victory.  Do not act as though you were smarting under the 
ignominy of defeat. (Xenophon, A History of My Times, pp. 
89-91)
 This comes from Xenophon's personal memory of that debate 
and probably represents the true words of Euryptolemus.  Yet, 
what one could call the hubris or arrogance of Athens would soon 
be quelled by its resounding defeat by Sparta at Aegospotami in 
Asia Minor in 405 B.C.E. Xenophon records the panic which final 
defeat wrought upon Athens:
　　As the news of the disaster was told, one man passed 
it on to another, and a sound of wailing arose and extended 
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first from Piraeus, then along the Long Walls until it reached 
the city.  That night no one slept.  They mourned for the lost, 
but more still for their own fate. (Xenophon, A History of My 
Times, p. 104)
 Perhaps the Athenians were remembering how merciless they 
had been to the islanders of Melos years before, whose city they 
had demolished, whose men they had slaughtered and whose 
women and children they had sold into slavery (Thucydides, p. 
408).  Now they were at the mercy of Sparta, their mortal enemy, 
and they feared for the worst.  Yet, Sparta was relatively merciful. 
Although, they demolished the Long Walls of Athens, reduced 
her navy to that of twelve ships, replaced her democracy with an 
oligarchy, and occupied the city, the Athenian people were not 
relegated to the same desperate fate as they had bestowed upon 
the islanders of Melos (Xenophon, A History of My Times, p. 107).  
 With all these events in recent memory, it was not hard for 
Xenophon in 401 B.C.E. to accept an invitation from a friend to 
join an army of Greek mercenaries who were going to fight for 
Cyrus, the brother of the Persian king (Xenophon, The Persian 
Expedition, p. 140).  Ten thousand unemployed Greek soldiers from 
all over Greece could not refuse this opportunity for adventure 
and the possibility for fortune.  Cyrus was on an expedition to 
crush a revolt in his Persian province, but this was only a disguise 
for his real intention of capturing the Persian throne from his 
brother, Artaxerxes.  It is estimated that Xenophon wrote the 
Anabasis almost thirty years after the event, judging from its style 
and great lack of important detail, but it is crucial in capturing 
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the thoughts of a transitional generation whose feelings would 
encompass both the deep-seated tradition of total involvement 
in one's own polis in the fifth century B.C.E. to that of feeling 
completely disconnected from it by the fourth century B.C.E., 
establishing the root of the disintegration of the traditional Greek 
city state by the time of Alexander the Great.  The Anabasis, 
which literally means ºthe journey up", was the first Greek 
account in geographical detail of the Persian Empire and would 
later greatly influence Alexander in his exploits in the same area, 
and was even followed by the Roman emperor Julian almost eight 
centuries later.  Xenophon traces the cause for the Anabasis from 
the uneasy transfer of power from Darius II to his son Artaxerxes, 
who suspected his brother, Cyrus, of plotting against him.  Cyrus, 
who commanded a province in Persia, quickly amassed his forces 
and sent messages to the Spartans and to other Greeks, asking 
them to join him in cleaning up disturbances within his province 
and promised them many rewards, but had a more ambitious plan 
in mind (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, pp. 55-57).
 Sparta felt a debt toward Persia for its economic aid during 
the Peloponnesian War and many Spartans responded to Cyrus' 
entreaties, as well as many other Greeks, including Xenophon. 
No one knew of Cyrus' intention of marching against the Persian 
king, for Cyrus knew that this information would immediately 
have aborted his Greek support. Xenophon joined the Greek 
army at Sardis in Asia Minor, where they met with Cyrus and 
his force, and began what they thought would be a short march 
inland. However, after quelling several tribal disputes within 
Phrygia, Cyrus led them east beyond his province.  The Greeks 
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did not like this and demanded their promised salaries, but were 
contented with a bonus for the time being until they went as 
far as Tarsus in Cilicia, where they rebelled.  They suspected 
Cyrus' true motive and insisted that this was not in their original 
agreement.  Cyrus bribed them on further with higher fortunes if 
only they would march to the Euphrates River, and it is here that 
Xenophon describes the Greeks as being wooed by the attraction 
of riches if Cyrus were victorious over Artaxerxes and of their 
possible appointments to wealthy satrapies across the Persian 
Empire (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, pp. 65-69).  However, 
this turned out to be quite premature.  As Cyrus marched his army 
through Babylonia, he was met at Cunaxa by his brother, the king. 
Although Artaxerxes' army was much larger, the experienced 
Greek soldiers drove the king back, but this was not enough for 
Cyrus who hastily charged into the center of battle intent on 
killing his brother, but only ended up himself being killed with a 
javelin (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, p.86--90). 
 The Greeks did not realize until the following day that Cyrus 
had been killed and had assumed that they had overwhelmingly 
won the battle.  Yet, neither a victory nor even a defeat on their 
part had much meaning at this point.  Cyrus was dead, and the 
Greeks found themselves leaderless and completely isolated within 
the heart of the Persian Empire.  The next few weeks became a 
stand-off as Artaxerxes ordered the Greeks to surrender their arms, 
but they refused.  The Spartan general, Clearchus, finally met with 
the Persian satrap, Tissaphernes, to state that the Greeks only 
wished to return home peacefully, and it seemed that Tissaphernes 
wanted nothing less.  He invited Clearchus and his top commanders 
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to a meeting for further discussions, whereupon they were arrested 
and later killed, while the soldiers accompanying them were 
immediately slaughtered (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, pp.123-
129).  Needless to say, the Greek mercenaries were stunned by this 
turn of events and quickly became despondent.  All of a sudden 
they were without their top generals or even their captains. Now, 
they thought, they would all have to suffer wretched ends in a 
strange land, far from home and at the hands of barbarians.  Thus, 
their mood soon deepened into a forlorn sense of misery (Xenophon, 
The Persian Expedition, p. 139).
 Yet, for Xenophon, this is really where the most interesting 
part of the ºmarch of the Ten Thousand" begins, and this is 
where his fame becomes kindled, for it is Xenophon, by his own 
recognition, who becomes the leader-savior of the Greek army. 
While the army is commiserating itself into paralysis, Xenophon 
receives a vision from Zeus during a dream.  When he awakens, he 
thinks:
　　What am I lying here for?  The night is passing and at 
dawn the enemy will probably be here.  If we fall into the 
king's hands, there is nothing to prevent us from seeing the 
most terrible things happening, from suffering all kinds of 
tortures and from being put to death in ignominy. (Xenophon, 
The Persian Expedition, p. 141)
 He, then, stood up and gathered all the captains and told them 
that he was not going to wait to be killed, which would certainly 
happen if they remained stationary.  Then, he said:
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　　…we are physically better able than they are to endure 
cold and heat and hardship; our morale is, with the gods on 
our side, better than theirs; and if the gods grant us victory, 
as they did before, our enemies are easier to wound and kill 
than we are. (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, p. 143)
 With this bold argument, Xenophon was appointed the new 
leader of the Greek army.
 This is where the legend of the ºmarch of the Ten Thousand" 
begins.  Without any precedent before them for inspiration, or any 
great knowledge of the geographical area that they were in and 
without support from Greece, yet with a great sense of forboding, 
the Greeks began their long march.  Xenophon appointed new 
commanders while they followed the Tigris River north into 
Armenia and towards the Black Sea.  Xenophon describes the 
Greeks as having to learn new techniques for crossing rivers and 
of creating new battle formations using their reserve forces, which 
would later influence Alexander the Great on his own campaigns 
in the east. 
 The Greeks were pursued by the Persian army until they 
entered the Carduchian Mountains, where Xenophon coaxed his 
troops to keep on marching through the deep snow, so as not to 
end up freezing to death or being killed by hostile tribes.  They 
marched over seven hundred miles from Cunaxa to Trapezus, 
which was on the coast of the Black Sea, and although they lost 
hundreds of men along the way, the survivors cried for joy when 
they saw the sea from the summit of the mountain, Thekes.  They 
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welcomed their trusted friend, the sea, and the worst of their 
journey was over.  They had escaped certain death and were now 
free to send for ships to sail away on (Xenophon, The Persian 
Expedition, p. 211) 
 However, their glory garnered no great admiration for them 
at the time.  They were considered little more than a band of cut-
throats for hire by their fellow Greeks at home, for they had gone 
to help the Persians for profit.  Thus, many of them remained in 
Asia Minor for a few more years, serving other kingdoms until the 
Spartan king, Agesilaus, took command of the Spartan troops in 
396 B.C.E. Xenophon had earned a bad reputation in Athens and 
was banned from returning there, but he became close friends with 
Agesilaus (Anderson, pp. 146-149).  Together they dreamed of a 
united Greek effort against Persia, much like the one they had had 
a century earlier, and believed in the sanctity of the aristocracy 
as the best way to conduct government. Xenophon fought with 
Agesilaus in Asia and in Greece when the Greek city states 
revolted against Sparta.  He fought with the Spartans against the 
Athenians and other Greeks at Coronea in 394 B.C.E. and was given 
favored status and an estate in Sparta at Scillus for a reward. 
 Here he lived the peaceful life of a landed aristocrat, raising 
his two sons in the harsh tradition of the Spartan youth. This is 
where he wrote his first works, but in 371 B.C.E. this all ended 
with the defeat of Sparta by Thebes at Leuctra.  Thus, he lost his 
estate and fled to Corinth (Anderson, pp. 162-169).  He returned 
to Athens for a time, but embraced the spirit of the Peloponnese 
until his death.  His later years were filled with disappointment. 
He witnessed the Sparta he loved being ravaged by Thebes and 
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everything that had once been stable and secure become confused 
and uncertain. Xenophon's Hellenika tends to exude a bitter tone 
throughout its later chapters and is often extremely subjective 
in its viewpoint.  He had not taken the time as Thucydides had 
in order to be more objective and fair in his representations of 
historical events, for, at this point in his life, he had become a 
loyal Spartan in his philosophical outlook.  For him, the Thebans 
are cowards, and he hardly mentions their legendary commanders, 
Epaminondas and Pelopidas, until the end of his narrative, 
because it had been they who had been responsible for Sparta's 
misery.  They had freed the helots from Spartan bondage and 
severely diminished its strength, making what had once been a 
stable environment, chaotic.  Those commanders had, essentially, 
castrated Sparta's power, and Xenophon's punishment for those 
he hated was clearly not to mention their names in his historical 
account.  He would assign them to oblivion.  The depth of his 
despair culminated in the death of his son, Gryllus, at the Battle 
of Mantinea in 362 B.C.E. To his credit, he does not name his son 
when writing of this battle, but his despair is poignantly clear. 
Greece is in a shambles and, having exhausted itself on useless 
conflicts, its future is dark.  Thus, he concludes his work with the 
Battle of Mantinea:
　　…both sides gave back the dead under a truce, as though 
they had won, and both sides received their dead under a 
truce, as though they had lost.  Both sides claimed the victory, 
but it cannot be said that with regard to the accession of 
new territory, or cities, or power either side was any better 
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off after the battle than before it.  In fact, there was even 
more uncertainty and confusion in Greece after the battle 
than there had been previously.  Let this, then, be the end of 
my narrative.  Someone else, perhaps, will deal with what 
happened later. (Xenophon, The Persian Expedition, pp. 396-
403)
 
 In conclusion, Xenophon has a very concise and clear writing 
style.  He does not embellish his narrative with digressions, but is 
contented with a single subject or idea at a time.  He is very easy 
to follow and is enjoyable to read.  However, from the standard of 
writing an objective historical work, he pales in comparison with 
a Thucydides, or the unknown Oxyrhynchus Historian. When the 
fragments of this unknown historian were found in Egypt early 
in the twentieth century, it was obvious that he was far superior 
to Xenophon in his detail and objectivity about both the Anabasis 
and the other events of the early fourth century B.C.E. And so, 
Xenophon's scholarship was severely debunked by comparison and 
throughout these particular translations used for this paper, the 
translators are constantly reminding the reader of crucial events 
or factors that Xenophon had completely disregarded.  At present, 
Xenophon's works are regarded as memoirs more than they are 
considered to be dependable histories, but in this sense alone they 
still achieve a mark of importance in understanding the fourth 
century B.C.E. Xenophon was more than just a literary scholar who 
cerebrally pieces together events from a distance and attempts 
to remain objective, for he was deeply and personally involved 
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in the events of that turbulent time.  He lived through the most 
disheartening period of Athens' fall from power; he marched with 
the ºTen Thousand"; he fought for several years with the king of 
Sparta, and was deeply involved in the affairs of that city state. 
 In short, Xenophon experienced first hand most of the events 
he wrote about in the Anabasis and the Hellenika.  While personal 
involvement may have negated his quality as an objective 
historian, nevertheless, he should not be faulted for supplying a 
subjective tone in the complicated and frustrating affairs of his 
generation, for he lived in a time of dramatic upheaval and change, 
where the old traditions of Greece were giving way to a new 
path and a new tradition which would culminate in the conquests 
of Alexander of Macedon later that same century.  It would be 
hard, indeed, for any contemporary historian so inextricably 
involved in his own times to remain completely detached from his 
personal feelings about them.  Xenophon is vitally important in 
understanding the affairs of Greece in the fourth century B.C.E. and 
was a witness and participant in what would be the final stages 
of Classical Athens as a predominant power in the Mediterranean 
and Aegean Sea areas.  He records Athens’ final gasp as a cultural 
force to be reckoned with as it is overshadowed by the giant from 
the north, Macedon. To understand the foundation upon which 
Alexander sets out for Persia, one must understand the power 
vacuum which resulted from Greece's inner struggles and civil 
wars a generation before.  When Classical Greece had wealth and 
power, it squandered it on petty struggles for even more power, 
and it would never have another chance to prove its leadership. 
Xenophon is important because he represents the older generation 
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dying out in a time which would never be repeated, for, by the 
end of his Hellenika, in 362 B.C.E., Greece is exhausted, leaderless 
and left wide open for an ambitious man like Philip II of Macedon, 
or his son, Alexander, to provide strong leadership in a bold new 
direction, while building upon the important traditions that the 
Classical Greeks bequeathed to them.    
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